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A NEW THEORY ON PHILO'S REVERSAL
DAVID N. STAMOS
Perhaps the most engaging of controversies in Hume studies con-
cerns Philo's reversal in Part XII of H urne's Dialogues ConcemingNatural
Religion. To one who reads the Dialogues for the first time, nothing comes
as more of a surprise to find that, after a long barrage of largely unan-
swered and seemingly devastating criticisms of the argument from design,
Philo, the main interlocutor, for apparently no reason, in the final Part
reverses his position in line with his main opponent. One senses, as with
Plato's Symposium, that nothing in such a masterpiece of literary archi-
tecture happens by chance, but instead must be significant. The difficulty
with Philo's reversal is that its significance is not immediately clear.
Indeed it seems a deliberate riddle, a dying man's final gift and challenge
to (and perhaps joke on) posterity. At any rate, one senses that, whatever
its meaning, its significance is such that if one could but uncover the
reason for Philo's reversal, one would have in one's possession the key to
unlocking the correct interpretation of Hume's philosophy of religion.
There have been, of course, quite a variety of theories offered over
the years to explain Philo's reversal. Given all of those theories, one has
to wonder how it is possible that so many professional scholars could
produce such a wide spectrum of interpretations on the twelfth and final
part of a fictional dialogue. It seems that Hume scholars, too, have a
particularly strong need to eke out their own individual exegetical niche,
with the consequence that no possible niche will remain for very long
without being taken seriously by some scholar or other.
And then perhaps there is something occurring here similar to what
Albert Schweitzer, in his classic The Quest ofthe Historicallesus, observed
in studying the diverse multitude of lives oflesus based on the Gospels.
Each author of a Life, he said, tended to infuse into the teaching of Jesus
his own doctrinal beliefs, liberal or otherwise, instead of remaining de-
tached and objective. Perhaps, then, many scholars interpret Hume's
philosophy of religion in accordance with their own theological (or
atheological) designs.
It is also possible that the fault lies more with Hume hirnself than
anyone else. It is possible that Hume constructed his Dialogues in such
a way as to follow an ancient tradition begun, arguably, by Heraclitus and
furthered by Plato. The tradition is one in which theform of a philosophi-
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cal work (or body of works) is intentionally constructed to reflect its
content. For Heraclitus, "Nature loves to hide" (fr. 123); accordingly it is
probahly not a coincidence that he wrote obscurely, paradoxically, and
prohahly originally in aphorisms. Like the oracle at Delphi, which he says
"neither speaks nor conceals, hut gives signs" (fr. 93), the form of
Heraclitus' writings reflect their content.
A similar argument can be made (and has been) in the case of Plato.
Not only does Plato think that rational discussion is the most important
and the most difficult part of philosophy (Rep. 498a), but also, if Letter
VII is authentic (and most scholars today think it is), we must take seri-
ously Plato's remarks (241c-d) that he has never put his true philosophy
into words, that there is no way to put it into words, that a grasp of his
philosophy is possihle only after a long period of dialectic and close
companionship, and that the knowledge of which his philosophy is con-
cerned is entirely ineffable. In this light his numerous dialogues appear
as reflections on water, far removed from truth and reality, their purpose
mainly introductory and initiatory rather than expository.
If for Hume, as he wrote in the final paragraph of his Natural History,
apparently in reference not so much to the history as to the truth of
religious belief in general, "The whole is ariddie, an enigma, an inexpli-
cahle mystery," perhaps we should then not be surprised ifwith an eye to
posterity he intentionally constructed his Dialogues (the evident sequel of
the pair), particularly Part XII, to reflect this riddle, enigma, and inexpli-
cahle mystery by being itself ariddie, an enigma, and an inexplicahle
mystery. All of this, of course, would fit perfectly weIl with Hume's
well-known penchant for irony.
Hut of course Hume himself may have thought he had the answer to
this riddle, or maybe the only reasonahle answer availahle to a man of
letters, and yet he may have deliherately chosen to make this also ariddie.
As James Noxon (1964) noted, "It seems that every precaution has been
taken to elude readers who want to fix Hume's own position" (p. 250).
Granted that this is so, I cannot myself forhear the opportunity to
offer myown solution to the latter riddle. So as to indicatewhyyet another
theory on Philo's reversal is called for, a critical review of the theories of
my predecessors would seem called for. Unfortunately, limitations of
space prevent me from providing this in the present work. Nevertheless,
the reader may deduce many of my criticisms in the course of the devel-
opment of my own theory.l
Following the suggestion of Norman Kemp Smith (1947: pp. 35-36)
and Antony Flew (1992: p. 57), it seems to me that Hume's own position
on religion is a form of Stratonician atheism (I should call it a weak form,
since it could not for Hume be dogmatic), which may in a peculiar way
be thought a theism (the matter does, in a way, seem entirely verbal),
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following the lead of Strato of Lampsacus. Interestingly Cicero, in his De
Natura Deorum, describes Strato as "the so-called natural scientist, who
thought that all divine power was to be sought in nature, which may
indeed provide the forces of birth, growth and decay but lacks any specific
form or conscious purpose" (McGregor 1972: p. 84).
This is a thesis which, to my knowledge, has yet to be systematically
defended, particularly with a Part-by-Part examination of the Dialogues.
To do so would require aseparate (and somewhat long) paper. (I myself
have completed this in manuscript form.) Suffice it for the present to
recall to mind Philo's two general definitions of God, the first one in
Part II-"the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God"
(p. 142)-the second in Part IV-"By supposing it [the material world] to
contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God"
(p. 162). Compare this, finally, with Philo's classic characterization of
nature in Part XI: "The whole [the universe] presents nothing but the idea
of a blind nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring
forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and
abortive children" (p. 211).
With this we now turn to my own theory on Philo's reversal. It is
founded upon basically two points. First, it seems to me that scholars
published on the topic of skepticism in the Dialogues have failed to
perceive (let alone appreciate) a crucial dynamic between Cleanthes and
Philo on this matter, adynamie that would go far to explain Philo's
strange reversal in Part XII. Second, it seems to me that scholars pub-
lished on the combined topic of Hume, belief in God, and natural belief
have failed to apply to this discussion a distinction which one would think
absolutely indispensable, viz., Hume's distinction in the Treatise and first
Enquiry between beliefs and ideas. Application of this distinction, it seems
to me, would prove as overstated both (i) the views of Pike (1970) and
Tweyman (1986) and others, including the stretched version of Penelhum
(1983), who have argued that belief in God for Hume is a natural belief,
and (ii) the views of Gaskin (1988) and Andre (1993) and others who have
argued the opposite, that belief in God for Hume is in some degree a
rational belief.2 Having failed to perceive and apply these two issues,
previous writers on Philo's reversal, it seems to me, could not help but fail
to satisfy. Indeed I suggest that the above two issues, properly analyzed,
jointly provide the key to unlocking the riddle of Philo's reversal.
Beginning with the distinction between beliefs and ideas, we see that
Hume has a very interesting concept of belief. It rests upon his doctrine
of impressions and ideas. According to Hume, the difference between a
belief and an idea is the same between an impression and an idea, minus
the temporal priority criterion. As revealed in the opening Section of
Book I of the Treatise, Hume has essentially two criteria for demarcating
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between impressions and ideas. The first is temporal priority: impressions
always (initially at least) precede their ideas and the latter are copied or
derived from the former. The second criterion is force and vivacity:
generally, impressions have more force and vivacity than ideas, although
the latter in some cases (e.g., the idea of causation) can acquire the level
of the former.
Applied to the idea of existence, Hume's classic discussion is to be
found in Book I of the Treatise, Section VII of Part 111. According to
Hume, "when after the simple conception of any thingwe wou'd conceive
it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first
idea" (p. 94). In other words, existence is not a quality of anything, of
which we have an additional idea. Accordingly the belief that x exists and
the belief that x does not exist are not two beliefs with different content.
They have virtually the same content. What, then, is the difference?
Hume's answer is that the difference consists merely in "the manner of
our conceiving them" (p. 96). More specifically, the difference is one of
"force and vivacity" (p. 96), just like the difference between actually
tasting pineapple and merely remembering that taste (p. 5). In the matter
of belief, in the former case (believing that x exists) the force and vivacity
of the idea is so great as to be on the level of an impression; in the latter
case (believing thatx does not exist) the force and vivacity of the idea does
not go beyond that which is common to ideas.
Now what of belief in God? If belief in God is to be what Hume
scholars call a natural belief, it must begin first as an idea before it can
be increased in force and vivacity to the level of a genuine belief In the
Treatise this follows from (i) not only that we have no innate ideas (p. 158),
but (ii) that we have no direct impressions of God: "our idea of that
supreme Being is deriv'd from particular impressions, none of which
contain any efficacy, nor seem to have any connexion with any other
existence" (p. 248; cf. pp. 94, 96n, and 160).3
In anticipation of my overall argument, I submit that tor both Philo
and Hume thefact ofdesign in the world is sufficient to cause no more than
the bare idea ofan intelligent designer.
At this point we may note that the possibility of genuine atheism is
not precluded. An atheist may have the idea of God and still be an atheist.
Merely having an idea does not constitute belief If, however, the force and
vivacity of his idea of God should be increased to that of an impression,
he would no longer be an atheist, whether he liked it or not.
Turning now more closely to the matter of natural belief, it is clear
in the Dialogues that Cleanthes is an advocate of the view that belief in
God is a natural belief, a belief like the belief in external existent objects,
where the force and vivacity is supplied by sensation. With his articulate
voice and vegetable library analogies in Part 111 we distinctly find an
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appeal to natural instinct. "Could you possibly hesitate a moment ... "
(p. 152), Cleanthes says in regard to the former analogy, and "Could you
possibly open one of them, and doubt ..." (p. 153), he says in regard to
the latter analogy. Indeed Cleanthes already in Part III seems to have feIt
the force of Philo's logical objections to the argument from design. He
accordingly now falls back on and appeals to what he calls irregular
arguments. Acknowledging the possibility of the defeat of his regular
argument, his argument from design in Part 11, he says:
And if the argument for theism be, as you pretend, contradictory to
the principles of logic: its universal, its irresistible influence proves
clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular nature. Whatever
cavils may be urged; an orderly world, as weIl as a coherent, articulate
speech, will still be received as an incontestable proof of design and
intention (p. 155).
Interestingly, the matter of irregular arguments has caused some
debate and argument among modern scholars. What exactly does Hume
mean by "irregular" arguments? It seems to me somewhat obvious that
in Part III what Cleanthes means by an "irregular argument" is not, for
example, his articulate voice and vegetable library analogies. Rather these
are thought experiments which analogically appeal to irregular argu-
ments. Irregular arguments have the force of (valid) regular arguments,
but they are not made by man. Instead they are made by nature. Their
force is the force of instinct. And their conclusions are irresistible.
When Cleanthes, then, puts forward his articulate voice and vegetable
library analogies, he is, I suggest, performing (or intending to perform)
what J. L. Austin calls perlocutionary acts, speech acts that produce some
sort of natural effect on their hearer (other than mere cognition). In
putting forth his two analogies, his two thought experiments, Cleanthes
is attempting to connect their instinctual force with what he claims is their
close analogue, the evidence of design in nature (i.e., order and
means-ends relationships). Indeed he gives us a description of an example
of one of these irregular arguments. He says:
Consider, anatomize the eye: Survey its structure and contrivance; and
tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not
immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The
most obvious conclusion surely is in favour of [intelligent] design; and
it requires time, reflection and study, to summon up those frivolous,
though abstruse, objections, which can support infidelity (p. 154).
Cleanthes's claim, then, in other words, is that the force of the argu-
ment from design is really instinctual, not logical, that only a Pyrrhonian
could resist it, and that such resistance would be "frivolous," meaning
that it could be maintained for only a short time.
Whether my interpretation of the nature of irregular arguments is
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eorreet or not, I suggest it is supported by referenee to Book I of the
Treatise, Seetion V of Part IV, in a passage in whieh Hume speeifieally
mentions irregular arguments. In eontradistinetion to human reason and
human arguments, Hume says: "Thus we may establish it as a eertain
maxim, that we ean never, by any prineiple, but by an irregular kind of
reasoning from experienee, diseover a eonnexion or repugnanee betwixt
objeets, whieh extends not to impressions ..." (p. 242). This passage
speeifieally refers baek to Seetion II of the same Part, in whieh Hume
makes mueh of the power of natural instinet over and against exeessive
skeptieism.
At any rate, it is important to realize that from Part III onward in the
Dialogues Cleanthes relies exelusively upon irregular arguments.4 That
relianee, however, is so elosely intertwined with the dynamie between
Cleanthes's and Philo's different kinds of skeptieism that it is best to
proeeed with that dynamie, keeping an eye open for Cleanthes's eontin-
ued appeal to irregular arguments.
We should begin by noting that early in Part I Philo expresses himself
in a way that would elearly suggest that his eritieisms throughout the
Dialogues are goingto be Pyrrhonian. He says: "Let us beeome thoroughly
sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason:
Let us duly eonsider its uneertainty and needless eontrarieties, even in
subjeets of eommon life and praetiee: Let the errors and deeeits ofour very
senses be set before us ..." (p. 131).
Cleanthes's reply is elassie and memorable: "Whether your scepticism
be as absolute and sineere as you pretend, we shalliearn bye and bye, when
the eompany breaks up: We shall then see, whetheryou go out at the door
or the window" (p. 132).
At this point we may be reminded of Pamphilus's eharaeterization of
Philo in the Introduetion, speeifieally "the eareless seeptieism of Philo"
(p. 128). The key word is "eareless." Admittedly it is suggestive of Hume's
eharaeterization of Pyrrhonian skeptieism in Seetion XII of the first
Enquiry, wherein Hume speaks of Pyrrhonism's "undistinguished
doubts" (p. 161). Following Tweyman (1986: p. 23), however, I agree that
it is not to the first Enquiry that we should turn for an interpretation of
the word "eareless" but to the Treatise, wherein Hume writes:
This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a
malady, which can never be radically cur'd, but must return upon us
every moment, however we may chase it away, and sometimes may seem
entirely free from it.... Carelessness and inattention alone can afford
us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them; and take it for
granted, whatever may be the reader's opinion at this present moment,
that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and
internal world ... (p. 218; italics mine).
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Contra Tweyman, however, it seems to me that, far from implying
Pyrrhonian skepticism, Pamphilus's characterization of Philo's skepti-
cism as "careless" refers (inadvertently) to this mitigated skepticism we
see here expressed in the Treatise by Hume.
Indeed Philo's reply to Cleanthes's door-or-window charge above
seems clear: "To whatever length any one may push his speculative prin-
ciples of scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse like other
men; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason than
the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing" (p. 134). Indeed Philo
even makes clear what will be the nature of his philosophizing in the
ensuing discussion:
To philosophize on such subjects ["natural or moral subjects"] is noth-
ing essentially different from reasoning on common life; and we may
only expect greater stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy,
on account of its exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding.
But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the
surrounding bodies: When we carry our speculations into the two eter-
nities, before and after the present state of things; into the creation and
formation of the universe; the existence and properties of spirits; the
powers and operations of one universal spirit, existing without begin-
ning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, infinite,
and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest ten-
dency to scepticism [in other words we must be a dogmatist] not to be
apprehensive, that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our
faculties. . . . We are like foreigners in astrange country ... (pp.
134-135).
The stage is thus set. Philo's program against Cleanthes is not going
to be Pyrrhonian skepticism but rather mitigated skepticism (as more
fully elaborated in Part 111 of Section XII of the first Enquiry). For the
purpose of argument, instead of employing Pyrrhonian skepticism, Philo
is going to presuppose the level of the vulgar.
Nevertheless, in spite of his early speeches, Hume sometimes gives
Philo the appearance of being an excessive instead of mitigated skeptic.
Philo's talk of the "triumph" of skepticism, of "counterpoising" or "coun-
terbalancing," and of achieving "suspension of judgment," is all reminis-
cent and suggestive of Hume's writings in Section XII of the first Enquiry,
in which Hume uses these modes of speech to mark the usefulness of
Pyrrhonian skepticism against dogmatism. Indeed Cleanthes, as we shall
later see, alongwith Pamphilus as we have already seen, seems clearly and
persistently to think Philo's criticisms Pyrrhonian. But that is all part of
Hume's strategie interplay in the Dialogues, and I suggest that it is inap-
propriate on the part of the reader to infer along with Cleanthes in this
way.
Nevertheless let us look at some of those passages which might seem
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to imply that Philo's criticisms are excessive. Beginning with the matter
of counterpoising, in Part III of Section XII of the first Enquiry Hume
mentions counterpoising in relation to the positive use for Pyrrhonian
skepticism. Hume says that in the absence of counterpoising (meaning
counterbalancing) arguments most people are naturally impelled into a
dogmatic position: " ... while they see objects only on one side, and have
no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipi-
tately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any
indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments" (p. 161). The
palliative Hume suggests is to counterpoise their position with "a small
tincture of Pyrrhonism," thus making them sensible of the frailty of their
position and inspiring in them some "modesty and reserve" and tolerance
toward others with different beliefs and opinions.
From this the program of counterpoising is naturally associated with
the positive use of Pyrrhonism. When we therefore find the program of
counterpoising employed by Philo in the Dialogues, it is only natural to
conclude that Philo's program is Pyrrhonistic. But I suggest that this
temptation should be resisted, for Part III of Section XII of the first
Enquiry is not the only place in which Hume discusses the usefulness of
counterpoising.
Hume's most extensive discussion on counterpoising is in fact found
in Section X of the first Enquiry, the famous Section titled "Of Miracles."
In his discussion there the main value of counterpoising is not as a
palliative against dogmatism; now its value is that it results in the "mutual
destruction of belief and authority." In Part I of Section X Hume notes
the effect of counterpoising on the matter of conflicting human testi-
mony. It "may diminish or destroy the force of any argument" (p. 113).
In the case where the conflict is not between individual pieces of
human testimony, but between., on the one hand, accumulated human
experience which establishes a connection between testimony and reality,
and, on the other hand, someone's claim to having experienced a miracle.,
Hume explicitly uses the word "counterpoize" and says "from which
contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoize, and mutual destruc-
tion of belief and authority" (p. 113). In other words, the experience of
the majority destroys belief and authority in the individual who claims
experience of a miracle, while the latter destroys belief and authority in
the experience of the majority.
The application of all of this to religion Hume makes explicit in Part
II of Section X:
[I]n maUers of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and that it is
impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of
China should, all of them, be established on any solid foundation. Every
miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these
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religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to
establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same
force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In de-
stroying a riyal system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles,
on which that system was established ... (pp. 121-122).
In this light, Philo's use of counterpoising in the Dialogues appears
remarkahly consistent. In Part 111 of Section XII of the first EnquiryHume
had argued that a little Pyrrhonian skepticism could counterpoise the
position of the dogmatist sufficiently long enough to alleviate the latter's
dogmatism. But we also know that according to Hume the force of nature
always wins out. One can he a Pyrrhonian for only a short time, only while
one is engaged in philosophical contemplation, never in practicallife. In
Part I of the Dialogues Philo, interestingly, makes essentially the same
point, hut then adds to it an allusion to the counterpoising point we found
in Section X of the first Enquiry:
All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, it
furnishes invincible arguments against itself, and that we could never
retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the sceptical
reasonings so refined and subtile, that they are not able to counterpoise
the more solid and more natural arguments, derived from the senses and
experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose this advan-
tage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined scepticism
comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose and
counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The
mind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very sus-
pense or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism (pp. 135-136).
When Philo, at the end ofPart V, proposes in succession "some infant
Deity," "some dependent, inferior Deity," and "some superannuated
Deity," and then goes on to claim that "these, and a thousand more ofthe
same kind, are Cleanthes's suppositions, not mine" (p. 169), he is employ-
ing that destructive kind of counterpoising that we found in Section X of
the first Enquiry. When Cleanthes dismisses Philo's argument as mere
"ramhling," he entirely misses the point. In first proposing the argument
from design, Cleanthes's intention was clearly to estahlish asolid founda-
tion for religion. In fact at the end of Part V he explicitly states his
intention, using the words "a sufficient foundation for religion" (p. 169).
Philo's point, then, is which religion? Since Cleanthes's empirical theism
equally supports thousands of them, they are all destructively counter-
poised and annihilated. As Philo says at the end of Part V, "I cannot, for
my part, think, that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any
respect, preferahle to none at all" (p. 169).
The most Philo will allow is what I have called weak Stratonician
atheism, which, as we saw with Strato himself, may include the appella-
tion of divinity in some nonconscious and natural and purely innocuous
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and ineffectual sense, without any of the consequences common to popu-
lar religion. As Philo said in Part IV, "By supposing it (the material
universe] to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert
it to be God" (p. 162). This is Philo's "true system of theism" (p. 165), in
contradistinction to Cleanthes's "experimental theism" (p. 165) and
Demea's "rigid inflexible orthodoxy" (p. 128). It is a theism, if it may be
called that, and the only one possible, that is devoid of that "licence of
fancy and hypothesis" (p. 169) which characterizes all the vulgar reli-
gions, including that of Cleanthes still in Part XII (cf. p. 224). And indeed
it is the "true system of theism" that Philo elaborates in Part XII, a theism,
or atheism--call it what you wi1l5-born out of wonder and awe at both the
immense and intricate workings of the universe, a wonder and awe that
has inspired scientists from Strato to Einstein. As Philo says, "To know
God . .. is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, supersti-
tious, and even impious" (p. 226).
Returning to the matter of counterpoising, we find the same destruc-
tive program being employed at the end of Part VI:
Push the same inference a step farther; and you will find a numerous
society of Deities as explicable as one universal Deity, who possesses,
within himself, the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these
systems, then, of scepticism,6 polytheism, and theism,7 you must allow,
on your principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has
any advantages over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy ofyour
principles (p. 175).
We find the same program at the end of Part VIII, perhaps in its most
classic form:
All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and insuperable
difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an
offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious
tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a com-
plete triumph for the sceptic; who teIls them, that no system ought ever
to be embraced with regard to such subjects: ... A total suspense of
judgment is here our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, as
is commonly observed, and no defence, among theologians, is success-
ful; how complete must be his victory, who remains always, with all
mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding
city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend? (pp. 186-187).
Tweyman (1986: pp. xii, 120) argues that by using and italicizing the
word "his" in the third line from the bottom, Hume meant to imply a
dissociation on Philo's part from the position of the skeptic there dis-
cussed. Tweyman finds in this further evidence for his general thesis that
in Parts 11 to VIII Philo's approach is a disingenuous Pyrrhonism for the
purpose of abating Cleanthes's dogmatism and bringing hirn to a position
of mitigated skepticism (Philo's real position all along). Accordingly Philo
will no longer employ Pyrrhonian skepticism in the rest of the Dialogues.
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To this I reply that there is no need to infer any dissociation whatso-
ever. Philo's argument here concerning counterpoising is perfectly con-
sistent with his previous speeches on counterpoising. By using and itali-
cizing the word "his" H urne is merely generalizing the victory of an
mitigated skeptics who dispute religion. By saying they (including him-
seIt) have "no fixed or abiding city" he is merely pointing out that they
have no dogmas (religious or atheistic) of which they are "obliged to
defend."
To funy warrant this interpretation we need only turn to the very last
passage in Hume's Natural History, expressed in Hume's own person,
which provides us with another classic passage on counterpoising:
The whole is ariddIe, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, un-
certainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result of our most
accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of
human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even
this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our
view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a
quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, hap-
pily make our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philoso-
phy (p. 182).
A more serious difficulty for my view presents itself at the end of Part
X, in which Philo seems to characterize his own arguments in Parts II to
VIII as mere "cavils and sophisms" (p. 202). This passage deserves some
discussion.
In an interesting passage in the Treatise, Hume writes of the cavils of
total skepticism, skepticism with regard to both reason and the senses,
that "Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scep-
ticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour'd by
arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently im-
planted in the mind, and render'd unavoidable" (p. 183; cf. first Enquiry,
p. 152).
The word "cavils" is thus associated in Hume with total or excessive
skepticism, or in other words Pyrrhonian skepticism. When we turn now
to the end of Part X, we find the following speech by Philo, placed in the
middle of the two-Part discussion on the problem of evil: "Here,
Cleanthes, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. For-
merly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence
and design, I needed an my sceptical and metaphysical subtilty to elude
your grasp" (pp. 201-202).
Philo here is quite disingenuous. He certainly in Parts II to VIII has
not employed an the skeptical and metaphysical arguments within his
grasp. He has not used any of the possible Pyrrhonian machinery that
Hume had elsewhere constructed and used hirnself (viz., his doctrine of
impressions and ideas). And yet he (Philo) provided strong argument-so
strong that many or most today consider his arguments decisive. Indeed
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in a number of places he claimed complete triumph. But now he deni-
grates those arguments in favor of his present one. I suggest that Philo
here is merely exhibiting what Hume in Section XII of the first Enquiry
claims "is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds
of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner" (p.
162). That Philo claims complete triumph against Cleanthes's theodicy
does not contradict this. Philo's argument and victory against Cleanthes's
theodicy is essentially a simple point of logic: "The consistence is not
absolutely denied, only the inference" (p. 205). The nature of Philo's
arguments in Parts II to VIII against Cleanthes's empirical theism are, on
the other hand, of the nature of probability arguments, and that against
a probability argument, and thus require some modesty.
To return to Philo's speech at the end of Part X, we continue imme-
diately from where we left off: "In many views of the universe, and of its
parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike
us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe
they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then imagine how
it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them" (p. 202).
What are the "mere cavils and sophisms" here? Philo's arguments in
Parts II to VIII against the argument from design? No. The "mere cavils
and sophisms" refer to the arguments of those total or Pyrrhonian skep-
tics who, in their excessive skepticism, doubt even that there is design in
the world (i.e., order and means-ends relationships). Philo nowhere in the
Dialogues doubts that; he along with Cleanthes presupposes it all along.
For Philo the question is concerning the cause of the design in the world.
As he says in Part 11, "order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final
causes is not, of itself, any proof of [intelligent] design; but only so far as
it has been experienced to proceed from that principle" (p. 146). In this
same way is to be read Philo's controversial statement in Part X: "You
ascribe, Cleanthes (and I believe justly) a purpose and intention to nature"
(p. 198). Far from being a declaration of reversal, this is but arepetition
(along with the other quotation from Part X above) of apremise held
throughout by Philo, apremise, incidentally, consistent with mitigated
but not Pyrrhonian skepticism.
Although I have long digressed here, all of this will prove necessary
in understanding the dynamic that occurs between Cleanthes and Philo
on the matter of skepticism. Without this background, the following
cannot be fully appreciated.
Returning to Part III of the Dialogues, after having given his two
analogies, we find Cleanthes (i) clearly associating hirnself with the posi-
tion of mitigated skepticism (what he here endorses as "reasonable skep-
ticism") and (ii) claiming that Philo's objections are excessive or
Pyrrhonian (a misapprehension that we will now directly trace):
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The declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject
abstruse, remote and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense
and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, wherever any reasons
strike hirn with so full a force, that he cannot, without the greatest
violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for natural religion are plainly
of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, obstinate metaphysics
can reject them. Consider, anatomize the eye: Survey its structure and
contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver
does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensa-
tion. The most obvious conclusion surely is in favour of [intelligent]
design; and it requires time, reflection and study, to summon up those
frivolous, though abstruse, objections, which can support infidelity
(p. 154).8
That at the conclusion of his speech Pamphilus interjects with his
observation that "Philo was a little embarrassed and confounded" (p. 155)
need not only be interpreted (as so many have) as an indication that Philo
was overwhelmed by the force of Cleanthes's appeal to irregular argu-
ments. More to the point, Philo was "a little embarrassed and con-
founded" because Cleanthes still continues to insist that he (Philo) is a
Pyrrhonian in this discussion when he is not!
We find that, from Part 111 onward, Cleanthes relies now only or
principally on his appeal to irregular arguments. At the end of Part VII,
confessedly unable to answer Philo's logical objections, he once more
relies on the appeal to instinct:
I am not ashamed to acknowledge myself unable, in a sudden, to solve
regularly such out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon
me: Though I clearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I
question not, but you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have
not the solution so ready as the objection; while you must be sensible,
that comm~n sense and reason is9 entirely against you, and that such
whimsies, as you have delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us
(p. 181).
Once again Cleanthes is doing two things: (i) he's appealing to instinct
rather than logic, and (ii) he's accusing Philo of being a Pyrrhonian (key
word "whimsies") and not a reasonable skeptic.
Philo's immediate reply to both charges is decisive:
What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention ... is entirely owing to
the nature of the subject. In subjects, adapted to the narrow compass of
human reason, there is commonly but one determination, which carries
probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound judgment, all
other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd and chimerical.
Hut in such questions as the present, a hundred contradictory views may
preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and invention has here full scope
to exert itself (p. 182).
Nevertheless Cleanthes persists. Once again, this tinle at the end of
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Part XI, we find Cleanthes admit quite frankly, and this time in a tone of
finality, the insufficiency of his regular argument from design. And once
again we find the implication that Philo's criticisms have so far heen
Pyrrhonian. "Philo, from the heginning," he says to Demea, "has heen
amusing hirnself at hoth our expence; and it must he confessed, that the
injudicious reasoning of our vulgar theology has given hirn hut too just
a handle of ridicule" (p. 213).
Indeed true to the end Cleanthes maintains his appeal to instinct and
his dismissal of Philo's ohjections as Pyrrhonian (alheit logically irrefut-
ahle). This is evidenced no less in Part XII, near its heginning:
The comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance is
so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many instances oforder and
design in nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced appre-
hensions, and procure universal approbation. Whoever attempts to
weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by establishing in its
place any other that is precise and determinate: It is sufficient for hirn,
if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote and abstract views of
things, reach that suspence of judgment, which is here the utmost
boundary of his wishes. But besides that this state of mind is in itself
unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained against such striking
appearances as continually engage us into the religious hypothesis. A
false, absurd system, human nature, from the force of prejudice, is
capable of adhering to with obstinacy and perseverance: But no system
at all, in opposition to a theory, supported by strong and obvious reason,
by natural propensity, and by early education, I think it absolutely
impossible to maintain or defend (p. 216).
Once again we find the claim by Cleanthes that Philo's earlier criti-
cisms were mere Pyrrhonian "doubts and difficulties." And once again we
find an appeal to "striking appearances" and ""natural propensity."10
What we find new is an interesting reference to "early education," the
significance of which I shall comment on shortly.
Turning finally to the problem of Philo's reversal, the seemingly
intractahle prohlem is that Philo, from the beginning of Part XII, in spite
of all his arguments heforehand, seems quite clearly, in more than one
passage and in more than one form of expression, to perform a complete
ahout-face and concede Cleanthes's original position. He says, for in-
stance, "Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself imme-
diately to our senses; were it possihle for hirn to give stronger proofs of
his existence, than what appear on the whole face of nature?" (p. 215).
Perhaps Philo's most definitive statement of this kind is the one that
appears two pages further in:
No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain our-
selves from enquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible: From
this enquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an
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analogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and suprerne
cause a God or Deity, hut desire to vary the expression; what can we call
hirn hut Mind or Thought, to which he is justly supposed to hear a
considerahle resernhlance? (p. 217).
That Philo is quite disingenuous here strikes us in its own way with
much force and vivacity. But why would he be disingenuous, particularly
considering the quality of his earlier arguments?
We must remember that Cleanthes was consistent in his misconcep-
tion of Philo's arguments as Pyrrhonian and that he never let up. We must
also remember that Philo more than once attempted to answer this charge
but to no avail. In addition to this, we must take notice of the fact that
though Cleanthes from Part III onward shifts the weight of his argument
off of his regular argument from design and onto his appeal to irregular
arguments from design, Philo continues to deal with the regular argu-
ment. Strongly implicit is that Philo did not think Cleanthes's appeal to
irregular arguments worthy enough to take seriously. Having his argu-
ments persistently misunderstood as Pyrrhonian, however, and seeing
Cleanthes continually revert to irregular arguments, I suggest that what
Philo did was perfectly rational and indeed quite brilliant. Far from
reversing his own opinion, he has reapplied an earlier strategy. In Part 11,
when the argument from design went first on trial, Philo said he was going
to "argue with Cleanthes in his own way" (p. 145). Now, by Part XII,
having fully exhausted the regular argument from design, having seen
that Cleanthes's dogmatism has not abated, that it has only shifted from
that argument to an appeal to instinct, and that Cleanthes still thinks
Philo's criticisms frivolous, Philo is going to do what is perfectly consis-
tent with his approach all along. He is going to do what any reasonable
and intelligent person (specifically Hume) would do in such a situation.
Once again, in Part XII, he is going to argue with Cleanthes "in his own
way."
Accordingly we find hirn, as in the two quotations above, profess the
force of Cleanthes's appeal to instinct. Having done that, Cleanthes's
characterization ofhis (Philo's) earlier position as Pyrrhonian has ceased.
This is evident after roughly three quarters of the way through Part XII,
where Cleanthes says "Take care, Philo ... take care: Push not matters
too far: Allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your
veneration for the true" (p. 224).
Could this really be Hume's view? Did Hume really think, along with
Cleanthes, that irregular arguments could naturally produce belief in
God, have epistemological value, and could serve as a respectable foun-
dation for religion?
This view seems clearly untenable. For one, it would mean that no
intelligent and educated person could truly be an atheist, and so we would
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have to therefore discount those places where Hume hirnself claims other-
Wlse.
Also, we know that for Hume natural beliefs have a necessary survival
value. As he says in the first Enquiry, " ... all human life must perish, were
his [the Pyrrhonian's] principles universally and steadily to prevail"
(p. 160). If Hume thought belief in God a natural belief, he would then
be committed to the view that belief in God has a necessary survival value.
Rut Hume could hardly have thought that. He was well aware (as are we)
that (i) there are genuine atheists, and (ii) that they (ceteris paribus)
flourish as easily as theists.
Second, we know that Hume did not think natural beliefs have epis-
temological value. As he says in his first Enquiry, the natural helief in
causation, "like other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful" (p. 159).
Third, that Hume would not think belief in God, if not a natural
belief, a respectahle foundation for religion, is evidenced in those many
piaces in his writings in which he expresses disgust and contempt for all
popular religions. II Moreover, as with both H urne'sand Philo's use of
destructive counterpoising, the question could always he asked: Why this
religion and not any of a thousand others?
What, then, was the point of Philo's new strategy, of his reversal?
It is at this point that, in addition to all of the foregoing, a heretofore
unnoticed and yet crucially important distinction must be introduced into
Hume studies, namely the distinction between natural belieft and natural
ideas. Hume scholars have coined and widely employed the phrase natural
beliefs for those beliefs which Hume explicitly identifies as instinctually
resistant to total or Pyrrhonian skepticism, the obvious examples being
belief in material bodies, in causation, and in personal identity. Rut given
Hume's explicit and important distinction between impressions and
ideas, a corresponding companion term for natural beliefs absolutely
cries out for discernment. Natural ideas seems to me the obvious candi-
date. Much like natural beliefs, natural ideas are instinctual and occur
irrespective of any conscious considerations. Rut unlike natural beliefs
(and there are obviously Dlore differences than this), natural ideas do not
have the force and vivac ity typical of beliefs; instead their force and
vivacity resides only at the level of ideas. Accordingly they can easily be
dismissed by reason, although they nevertheless persist given the appro-
priate stimuli. Of course if one searches through Hume's writings for the
phrase "natural ideas," one will search in vain, just as if one would search
for the phrase "natural beliefs." Rut just as the latter concept is clearly to
be found in Hume's writings, I submit that so is the former. Without going
into a lot of examples, it seems to me that the clearest ones, and the nl.ost
relevant for the present discussion, are to be found in Hume's 1751 letter
to Gilbert Elliot ofMinto (reprinted in Flew 1992: pp. 21-25). In this letter
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Hume refers to "our Inclination to find our own Figures in the Clouds,
our Face in the Moon, our Passions & Sentiments even in inanimate
Matter" (p. 23). Hume immediately goes on to say that "Such an Inclina-
tion may, & ought to be controlled, & can never be a legitimate Ground
of Assent." (Corroborating evidence, with some of the same examples and
with much the same conclusion, is to be found in Section III of the Natural
History.) Clearly such are ideas, not belieJs, although equally (in asense)
natural. What is so interesting and relevant is that Hume prods Gilbert
Elliot for some sort of proof that such natural ideas are different from
Cleanthes's appeal to irregular arguments in Part III of the Dialogues. But
what is of especial significance is that immediately before the above
passage Hume suggests that irregular arguments for God's existence do
not have the same force as natural beliefs based on sensation. He says "I
could wish that Cleanthes's Argument could be so analyzed, as to be
rendered quite formal & regular. The Propensity of the Mind towards it,
unless that Propensity were as strong & universal as that to believe in our
Senses & Experience, will still, I am afraid, be esteemed a suspicious
Foundation."
Returning to the question of Philo's reversal, I suggest, then, that the
advantage of Philo's new strategy, his not-so-obvious plan in Part XII to
once again "argue with Cleanthes in his own way," is that, employing a
strategy very different from counterpoising, he could show Cleanthes the
insufficiency of his appeal to irregular arguments without being charged
with Pyrrhonism. He could therefore be taken seriously by Cleanthes. I
believe that Philo's (and Hume's) ultimate point, contra Cleanthes and all
others who would share his view, is that irregular arguments for God's
existence can get us no further than the mere idea of an intelligent
designer, and therefore not to a beliefin an intelligent designer. This is
because the idea of an intelligent designer produced exclusively by irregu-
lar arguments must always be, to borrow Pamphilus's words in the Intro-
duction, "obscure and uncertain" (p. 128).
Interestingly, there is external evidence that this indeed was Hume's
own view. In his essay "The Sceptic" he says:
(A]n abstract, invisible object, like that which natural religion alone
presents to us, cannot long actuate the mind, or be of any moment in
life. To render the passion of continuance, we must find some method
of affecting the senses and imagination, and must embrace some histori-
eal, as weIl as philosophical account of the divinity. Popular supersti-
tions and observancesare even found to be of use in this particular" (p
167).
This is precisely what Philo seems to be getting at near the end of Part
XII, the oft-quoted passage, wherein he says "If the whole of natural
theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple,
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though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that the
cause or causes 0/order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy
to human intelligence . .." (p. 227). Philo's point is that the idea of an
intelligent designer (or designers) generated by the fact of order and
design in the world can never by itself be sufficiently clear to be increased
in force and vivacity to the level of a belief. 12 This is why he says less than
half a page later that "the most natural sentiment [key words 'natural
sentiment'], which a well-disposed mind will feeIon this occasion, is a
longing desire and expectation, that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate,
at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more par-
ticular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature,
attributes, and operations of the divine object of our Faith" (p. 227).
If the design we find in nature is insufficient by itself to naturally
increase the idea of an intelligent designer to the level of a belief, then
what is sufficient? Part of the answer was hinted at earlier in this paper
in a quotation from Cleanthes, namely education,13 while another part is
what Hume calls less politely in Part V of the Dialogues the "licence of
fancy and hypothesis" (p. 169), what he calls even less politely in the final
Section of the Natural History "siek men's dreams" and "the playful
whimsies of monkeys in human shape" (p. 181).14 Specifically what these
do is add additional ideas to the core idea, thus making it less obscure and
more comprehensible, and through inculcation, ritual, and so forth,
increase the force and vivacity of this aggregate of ideas into a belief. That
the various possibilities of this aggregate is immense, helps account for
the great variety of belief in divinity throughout the ages and at any one
time.
In this light Philo's apparently fideistic remark at the end of Part XII
makes perfeet Humean sense:
Aperson, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural
reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the
haughty dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of
theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any farther aid, and
rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical sceptic is, in
a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being asound,
believing Christian ... (pp. 227-228).
That Hume was no sound, believing Christian, let alone a Christian,
and that he was no fideist, is supported by overwhelming evidence (see my
note 11). He was an infidel (see my note 8), who early in life gave up all
religious belief (see H urne's 1751 letter to Gilbert EIliot), and who thought
Christianity as bigoted a superstition as any (see his interview by Boswell).
When Hume, through Philo above, implies that the dogmatist lacks "a just
sense of the imperfections of natural reason," and claims that a philo-
sophical skeptic will require revealed religion to become "a sound, believ-
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ing Christian," he is but sealing the thesis I have here formulated. Far
from prescribing any fideism on his or Philo's part, he makes the point
that whether one is a dogmatist or a mitigated skeptic, whether he puts
his trust in regular or irregular arguments, he will always find them
insufficient for theistic belief, and therefore as a foundation for religion,
and will find hirnself forced, if he wills to be a true believer, to add that
"lieence of faney and hypothesis," or more specifically "revelation,"
which requires, as he says with delicious wit and humor at the end of his
Section "Of Miracles" in the first Enquiry, a miracle for anyone to believe
it, a miracle "which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and
gives hirn adetermination to believe what is most eontrary to custom and
experienee" (p. 131).
It is regrettable, perhaps, that Hume nowhere, particularly in the
Dialogues, brought out clearly his belief/idea distinction and applied it to
the matter of natural religion. But then to do so would have revealed his
own position all too easily, and would have ruined the riddle.
What, then, finally, are we to make of Pamphilus's closing appraisal
at the very end of Part XII, in whieh he says " ... upon a serious review
of the whole, I cannot but think, that Philo's principles are more probable
than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the
truth" (p. 228)? Can this assessment refleet Hume's own view?
It has been argued by various commentators that this closing ap-
praisal serves basieally two functions: (i) to help avoid a one-sidedness and
imbalance in the Dialogues, a problem that Hume was acutely eoncerned
with, as noted even in the Introduction (p. 127), and (ii) to still any
ecclesiastical recriminations.
At any rate, what seems decisive as to why we should not aecept
Pamphilus's closing assessment is a clue given in the Introduction itself.
Not only is Pamphilus a close pupil of Cleanthes, as noted at the beginning
of Part I, and thereby bound to be biased, but Pamphilus in the Introduc-
tion says of hirnself that his "youth" rendered hirn a "mere auditor" of
the disputes. Pamphilus thereby admits incompetence on anything be-
yond mere recital, and any inclination to give weight to his appraisal at
the end of Part XII, as expressing Hume's own view, ought to be counter-
poised with this consideration.
1 The theories on Philo's reversal of which I take cognizance are those of
Mossner (1936: pp. 346-347), Kemp Smith (1947: pp. 30, 39, 61-63, 70), Noxon
(1964: pp. 259-260), Pike (1970: pp. 233-237), Penelhum (1983: pp. 171-180),
Tweyman (1986: p. ix), Gaskin (1988: pp. 6-7,125-127), Yandell (1990: pp. 39,
165), and Andre (1993: pp. 149-153).
2 My approach has the added advantage that it saves Hume from a large
amount of self-contradiction. Certainly if Hume held the view that belief in God
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is either a natural belief or a rational belief (vestigial or otherwise), he would then
be contradicting hirnself in those places where he names true or genuine atheists
(for irtstance Lord Maris(;hal in his interview by Boswell, quoted in Wain 1992:
p. 251). On either of the two above views it would be impossible for a man ofletters
to be an atheist. That Hume names true or genuine atheists, and educated ones
at that, calls for a different interpretation of Hume.
3 That Hume changes emphasis in the first Enquiry (pp. 19-20) to that of
an idea derived from impressions of inner reflection, which thereby excludes
impressions of sensation, does not contradict the present interpretation. There
is a significant difference between the idea of an intelligent designer of the world
and "an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being," and the idea of each may
weH be accounted for by very different types of impressions.
4 Interestingly, Cleanthes in this is being true to his namesake, namely
Cleanthes the successor of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. As J. M. Ross pointed
out in his Introduction to H. C. P. McGregor's (1972) translation of Cicero's De
Natura Deorum, "the Stoics postulated an instinctive criterion of certainty which
compelled assent to any true perception" (p. 74n).
5 As Hume was fuHy aware, Cicero, on the one hand, as we have seen,
characterized the Stratonician view as a theism, whereas Pierre Bayle, on the
other hand, explicitly thought it an atheism (see Kemp Smith 1947: p. 85).
6 I suggest Hume more properly means here dogmatic atheism.
7 I suggest Hume more properly means here monotheism.
8 Interestingly, this is precisely how Hume characterized hirnself (viz., as
an infidel). See, for instance, one of his letters quoted in Kemp Smith (1947:
p.7).
9 That Hume here has Cleanthes use the word "is" instead of the gram-
matically correct "are" seems to me significant. For Cleanthes, common sense
and reason are one, just as, on his view, what he calls reasonable skepticism and
empirical theism are perfectly in accord (p. 154). Cleanthes also thinks that
irregular arguments have epistemological status. Philo and Hume, as we shall see,
do not share this view.
10 I suggest that the sentence in which this phrase is found, so as to accord
with the overall gist of Cleanthes's speech, be read as follows: " ... supported by
strong and obvious reason, i.e., by natural propensity ..."
11 See, for example, Hume's 1743 letter to William Mure of CaldweH, his
essay "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm," his criticisms in the final Section of the
Natural History, Philo's criticisms in Part XII ofthe Dialogues, as weIl as Boswell's
interview with Hume. Indeed examples abound.
12 An important part of my argument would seem to turn on this very
point. Among those who have thought that it is Cleanthes who speaks mainly for
Hume, Pike (1970) fully admits that the conclusion of Cleanthes's appeal to
irregular arguments is "regrettably vague and incomplete'" (p. 233)-though I
should think there is a lot more to it than just the fact that "it does not include
mention of the moral attributes of the crucial matter is whether for Hume a vague
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and incomplete idea can by itself be raised to the level of a belief. In the Treatise,
the answer seems a clear "No." According to Hume, "all impressions are clear and
precise" (p. 72), and only ideas may be "obscure" (p. 33; cf. p. 73). Since we must
begin with an idea of God-as mentioned earlier, according to Hume we have
neither an innate idea of God nor any direct impressions of God-it necessarily
follows on Hume's account that we must first begin with a clear and precise idea
of God if it is to be raised in force and vivacity to the level of an impression. This
follows because (i) an impression is no different in content than its corresponding
idea, and (ii) it is of the nature of impressions that they cannot be obscure and
vague. The same would seem to follow for beliefs. But irregular arguments give
us neither a clear and precise impression nor a clear and precise idea. Irregular
arguments, then-not to mention regular ones-must in themselves be insufficient
for belief.
13 Hume's most definitive passage on the power of education is to be
found in Book I of his Treatise:
I am persuaded, that upon examination we shall find more than one
half of those opinions, that prevail among mankind, to be owing to
education, and that the principles, which are thus implicitly
embrac'd, over-ballance those, which are owing either to abstract
reasoning or experience. As liars, by the frequent repetition of their
lies, come at last to rememher them; so the judgment, or rather the
imagination, by the like means, may have ideas so strongly imprinted
on it, and conceive them in so full a light, that they may operate upon
the mind in the same manner with those, which the senses, memory
or reason present to uso But as education is an artificial and not a
natural cause, and as its maxims are frequently contrary to reason,
and even to themselves in different times and places, it is never upon
that account recogniz'd by philosophers; tho' in reality it be built
almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our
reasonings from causes and effects (p. 117).
14 To all of this we may add his discussion in the Treatise (repeated in the
first Enquiry, pp. 51-52) on the practices of the Roman Catholics:
The devotees of that strange superstition usually plead in excuse
of the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that they feel the
good effect of those external motions, and postures, and actions, in
inlivening their devotion, and quickening their fervour, which other-
wise wou'd decay away, if directed entirely to distant and immaterial
objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, they say, in sensible
types and images, and render them more present to us by the imme-
diate presence of these types, than 'tis possible for us to do, merely
by an intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have
always a greater influence on the fancy than any other; and this
influence they readily convey to those ideas, to which they are re-
lated, and which they resemble (pp. 99-100).
On this account the teaching that God was made flesh, and of transubstan-
tiation, may perhaps be included among the most vivid displays of this principle.
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